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Introduction 
A qualified and motivated pool of professors and researchers is a key input in any 
successful higher education endeavor (Salmi, 2009). Hiring professors with adequate 
qualifications is, of course, part of the answer to achieve this. However, improving the 
competitiveness of a university from within, and when the academic career has been 
historically based on age rather than on merit, is a much more difficult task.  We believe 
a simple and transparent results-based incentive scheme can help reshape academic 
performance. Universidad del Pacífico, a medium size not for profit private institution 
specialized in economics and business fields, launched in 2007, an incentive system 
with these characteristics (Universidad del Pacífico, 2008). Monetary bonuses and 
promotions are linked to a set of results indicators, each having a particular weight 
which reflects university’s priorities regarding teaching skills and research 
accomplishments and dissemination. We describe this incentive system, briefly discuss 
the internal “politics” of its approval and implementation, and assess its potential effects 
on academic performance after 5 years of continuous operation.  
Average growth of 39% in per capita production during the initial two years could be 
contaminated by a reporting effect. However, additional rounds of average growth of 
21% in subsequent years suggest that the system has elicited real increases in 
productivity in most university professors. The system has been enshrined in the 
university´s formal statutory decrees and is well placed as a productivity yardstick for 
current and incoming professors in all faculties. We believe this experience can provide 
useful lessons on how to create a critical turning-point in universities in developing and 
developed countries. 
Las opiniones expresadas en este documento son de exclusiva responsabilidad de los autores y no 
expresan necesariamente aquellas del Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico o de 
Universidad misma 
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Method 
Up to 2007, the academic career at Universidad del Pacífico was heavily dependent on 
age rather than on merit. Also, there was high salary dispersion between professors. 
This scenario raised the need for a reform that ought to deal with two main concerns. 
From within, we needed to reshape our understanding of productiveness, provide 
incentives to improve it, and align salaries accordingly. From the outside, we needed to 
attract promising young academics by streamlining and making career development 
more transparent. 
Taking all these elements into account, we developed an incentives scheme with four 
pillars related to the main areas where a professor constructs its professional career. As 
a lecturer, a professor is expected to produce significant learning experiences with 
his/her students. Secondly, as a researcher, a professor is expected to produce and 
publish quality research work. Also, as a manager, a professor is expected to obtain 
external funding for his work and contribute to the institution decision-making 
processes. Finally, as a doer, a professor is expected to disseminate the results of his/her 
research efforts and to provide solutions relevant to public and private organizations. 
Academic development in these pillars involves different results, listed in Table 1. 
General principles used to choose criteria and the relative weights for items within each 
pillar were: (i) items should reflect results more than products. For example, more 
important than the number of hours a professor teaches (product) is the significant 
learning experience of his or her students (result); (ii) the criteria must be transparent 
and easy to measure. We proposed to work with products with an easy-to-measure 
associated result, resembling quality. For example, an article (product) published in a 
peer-reviewed journal (result) is a significant contribution to knowledge; and  
(iii) results have to be related with the four pillars described above. This may seem 
obvious, but helps to narrow down the different products and results that a professor 
makes. 
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Table 1: Relevant information concerning each pillar 
 
 
In addition, we needed to measure all items in the same unit. We named this unit 
“Unidad de Productividad” or UP, the same acronym of our university. Therefore, the 
sum of all UPs accumulated in a year by each professor measures in a simple and 
transparent way his/her total productivity (TP). A crucial ingredient of the system is the 
relative weight of each item and pillar in the overall evaluation. This can be easily 
introduced by assigning a different number of UPs to each item. An interfaculty 
commission appointed by the Rector made an initial proposal, based on our institutional 
As a teacher
As a reasercher 
and/or consultant
As a manager As a doer
- Students 
evaluation survey
- Books - Conference or 
course organizer
 -Peer evaluation 
survey
- Book's chapters - Conference or 
course lecturer
- Lecturer in other 
universities
- Papers on journals - Conference 
discussant
 -Thesis jury in 
other universities
- Other teaching 
materials
- Board member in a 
public or private 
organization
 -Mean score in 
advisory
- Working papers - Value of a column or 
an interview in the 
media
- Mean score in 
mentoring
- Reviews - Extraordinary honors 
and awards
- Journal editor
- Annual overhead 
on research and 
consultancy services
- Annual university 
operating plan goals 
achieved
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mission, which was then validated through several rounds of participatory meetings 
with all faculty members.    
The last step of the reform was to tie this scheme to promotions and salary. With this 
reform in place, a professor needs to score within the upper third of the university 
productivity distribution for 3 to 5 years to be able to get a tenured position and to 
access to the following two professor categories (associate and principal). In the “best 
case scenario” a new full time lecturer can become a principal professor in eleven years. 
In terms of salary, incentives work in two ways. The first one is an annual bonus that 
can be as high as two more monthly salaries and as low as cero, depending on the 
number of UPs accumulated in the year. The other monetary recognition is tied with the 
salary range for each professor category. In this case, the incentive in more linked with 
the academic career, but also involves a monetary recognition.   
The sustainability of this institutional reform needed to consider additional criteria to 
reduce adverse reactions and generate consensus: 1) Results must be doable: We 
needed to strike a balance between what we can do and we want to do, 2) Consult with 
your faculty: This scheme won’t work if it is perceived as imposed. However, it was 
important to remember that we are not trying to recognize what we are currently doing, 
3) New rules of promotion should apply to new professors: New qualifications and 
standards of promotion will apply only to those who are starting their academic career, 
4) You have to show that the system works: A preliminary evaluation, based on two 
years of past performance, helped to launch transitory measures to start correcting 
salary dispersion via bonuses, and, 5) Prepare your intranet system to gather 
information you need to evaluate: Having a special intranet site to gather professors’ 
information is vital. Also, department heads play a crucial role validating each result. 
Results 
Since 2007, we have performed five assessments, including a transitional 2006/2007 
evaluation undertaken in 2008. This transitional evaluation is our  
baseline scenario because it tries to capture mean productivities in the absence of the 
incentive system. Taking this period as a baseline, we can observe and judge changes in 
the TP in the following years. Although we need to account for potential biases (“a 
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reporting effect”) in the initial years, results so far are very promising indicating true 
productivity increases in the faculty. 
As can be seen in Table 2, TP has raised around 4 UP’s per capita every year since the 
incentives scheme started. Also, we can observe a rise in every area of evaluation during 
these 5 years.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average Annual Productivity Change 
 
 
Conclusion 
Graph 1 plots initial TP levels for each professor against the new average TP levels 
reached in subsequent years. The overwhelming majority of professors have been able 
to increase their observable productivity levels, since all dots but five surpass the 45 
degree line. This result is good news for the incentive scheme since it has apparently 
elicited more effort and tangible results by the staff. 
Graph 1: Initial TP versus Average TP  
in Subsequent Evaluations 
 
(Initial Evaluation (X Axis), Average in Subsequent Evaluations (Y Axis), 45° line) 
Period
Productivity 
Change
Teaching 
Capabilities
Academic 
Production
Resources 
and Fees
Disemination TP
Absolute 2.23 1.16 -0.12 1.13 4.41
Var. % 80% 52% -33% 19% 39%
Absolute 1.84 1.42 0.25 0.44 3.95
Var. % 28% 35% 62% 6% 21%
06-07 / 08
09 / 11
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However, there seems to be three emerging groups: A high-productivity one which has 
been able to increase its output further. A medium-productivity cluster which has 
boosted its production the most with the incentive system. Last, but not least, a low 
productivity group which has shown rather disappointing results in spite of the system. 
It is a high risk cluster that needs to be closely monitored. They might need to redefine 
their terms of contract with the university, since their productivity and effort levels are 
not meeting the institution´s expectations.  
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